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Abstract: Cyber supply chain (CSC) provide an organization 
with the ability to align its business processes, information 
flows and data structures with other organization. However, 
the increase interdependencies have brought about inherent, 
threats, risks, attacks and vulnerabilities that adversaries may 
be able to exploit when not properly mitigated. Additionally, 
every cyberattack on each organization increases the 
probability of the risk cascading to others. The CSC risk has 
increased exponentially due to uncertainties surrounding 
cyberattacks and the cyber threat landscape. Recent CSC 
threats have been disruptive and impacting on the smooth flow 
of delivery of products and services. CSC risk has been 
observed as one of the areas that impact greatly and causes 
budget overruns. The aim of this paper is to mitigate CSC
risks in an organizational landscape. In particular, the paper
identifies supply inbound and outbound chain threat 
landscape using a risk breakdown structure. Further, we 
assess the risk to gather cyber threat intelligence.
Furthermore, we use the probability distribution method to 
determine the CSC risks and analyze the risk probabilities and 
likelihood of risk cascading impact.  Our results show that 
CSC risk can be neutralized using probability distribution 
methods to detect and mitigate the risks and their impact 
levels.
Keywords: Cyber Supply Chain; Risk Mitigation; Threat 
Landscape; Cyber Physical System; Risk Management
I. INTRODUCTION 
Supply chains systems are increasingly operating 
immensely in the last decade in a more connected global 
environment [1]. So are the risks and vulnerabilities. 
According to ITPRO, 50% cyberattacks now uses island 
hooping to target their victims infiltrating the smaller 
companies to gain access to the large organizations.. 
Financial, retail and manufacturing business is in the firing 
line of this increasing popular cyberattack method [2].
Cyber supplier inbound and outbound Chain risks and 
threats have increased exponentially as organizations 
integrate their services and products on the CSC system. 
Many organizations and banks outsource their sensitive 
customer data, financial information, business strategy and 
organizational structures to third party companies and 
vendors for storage, processing, analysis, delivery and 
aggregation for business decisions. The primary objective 
of cyber supply chain risk mitigation is to identify, assess 
and mitigate products and services that may contain 
potentially malicious functionality, are counterfeited or are 
vulnerable due to poor manufacturing and development 
practices within the cyber supply chain [3]. CSC attack 
could be initiated through a network, embedded malicious 
soft, vulnerable website or through spear phishing. It has 
become inevitable to carry out a risk assessment to gather 
threat intelligence of threat actors motives, intents, attack 
vectors, vulnerable spots and adversary goal require to 
mitigate the cyber risks. The inbound suppliers include the 
external organization that has remote access to the CSC 
system and provides electric power transmission, [4] the 
banks that provide the electronic products and payments as 
well as third party vendors that purchase the electricity 
directly and then sell it to consumers. For instance, in an 
inbound supply chain environment, the adversary could 
target CMS systems through a third party supply chain 
system with the bank [5]. Here, the bank receives bill 
payment through online banking services on behalf of the 
organization then transfer the funds into the organization's 
accounts directly. The organization can experience attacks 
on the physical and network infrastructures that support the 
application processes.  The adversaries goal is to use inland 
hopping attack to penetrate the supply chain system, gain 
access to the valuable information stored through a third 
party and potentially commit large scale cyberattacks.
Therefore, security requirements engineering approach can 
provide a comprehensive and structured elicitation and 
understanding of cybersecurity requirements, attack vector, 
threat analysis and intelligence models in supply chain 
environment. 
The aim of this paper is to mitigate cyber supply chain 
risks by identifying attacks, threats and vulnerable spots 
within the cyber supply inbound and outbound chains and 
third party organization landscape. The contribution of this 
paper is in threefold: (1) identifying the supplier inbound 
and outbound chains threat landscape that may pose a risk 
on the system, (2) use probability distribution method to 
analyze the probability of the threats cascading and (3) 
finally develop mitigating techniques to control the risks.  
II.  RELATED WORKS 
CSC has improved business processes, enhance 
transparency, speed in productivity and increase accuracy, 
as well as monitoring and control. However, CSC risks in 
the supply inbound and outbound chain has been 
increasing especially with the advent of cyberattacks and 
it is affecting the smooth flow of resources even in the 
most robust supply chains systems. [6], proposed a 
mitigating risk of a cyberattack on a smart grid system by 
discussing the fragmented landscape of studies into the 
risk of cyber attacks on a smart meter, system engineering 
and fault tolerance.  [7], proposed cybercrime risks on CPS 
that used subjective judgment and Analytical hierarchal 
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process (AHP) to determine risks.  NIST [8] proposed a 
CSCRM guideline that identifies, assesses, selects and 
implement risk management processes and mitigation 
controls through an organization to help manage ICT 
supply chain risks from adoptive tier 1 through to 
implementation tier 4. NCSC [8] proposes a supply chain 
risk guidance with a series of 12 principles, designed to 
help establish effective control and oversight of your 
supply chain by identifying what needs protecting, 
knowledge of supplier's system, and security risk posed by 
the supply chain. [10], proposed a cybersecurity threat 
modelling for supply chain organizational environment, 
by analyzing CSC attacks and cyber threat reporting 
among supply chain stakeholders. [11], proposed the 
application of logical and systematic methods of 
establishing the context of identifying, analyzing, 
evaluating, treating risk associated with any activity, 
process, function and product. [12], provide guidelines for 
establishing a systematic approach for risk management 
necessary to identify organizational security requirements 
for information security. [13], proposed an intuitive 
scheme for the categorization of cybersecurity risk 
assessment methods for SCADA systems by analyzing the 
twenty-four risk assessment method. [14], proposed a risk 
assessment in CPS from an office environment by 
identifying physical security and information and 
clarifying risk from a user perspective.   NIST 800-30 [15]
proposed a risk assessment approach to support enterprise-
wide risk management required to mitigate purposeful 
attacks, environmental disruptions, human or machine 
errors, and structural failures.  [17], proposed a 
probabilistic threat propagation for network security by 
present a method for detecting malicious and infected 
nodes on both monitored networks and the external 
internet. [18], proposed an intuitive scheme for 
categorizing cybersecurity risk assessment method for 
SCADA systems after reviewing 24 risk assessment 
methods applied in the context of SCADA systems.
III.  APPROACH  
This section adopts the Cyber Supply Risk 
Management approach required to be carried out through 
the lifecycle of the organizational CSC. An organization 
should be able to identify its assets, goal, specific 
requirements and threat actors. [11] [18], posits that risk 
assessment is the most error-prone step in risk management 
process due to the uncertainties in estimating the magnitude 
of potential financial loss and the probability that the loss 
will occur. By quantitatively assessing vulnerabilities and 
proposed a method for evaluating security enhancement. To 
Mitigate CSC risks, we consider a potential cyberattack 
could affect an organizational supply chain and determine 
the vulnerabilities, threat landscape, and the associated 
risks that are likely to impact the organization. For the study 
we adopt the CSCRM process below: 
Risk awareness and preparation
Risk identification
Risk assessment: Analysis and Evaluation
Risk response: Risk transfer, risk sharing, risk reduction    
& risk avoidance
Risk communication
Risk monitoring and control
A.     Risk Mitigation Approach 
For the study, we adopted the probability distribution 
methods and to mitigate the CSC risks. The rationale for 
choosing probability distribution methods and the financial 
portfolio criteria model is that, CSC risks can be quantified 
based on how threats propagate on the supply inbound and 
outbound chains and its cascading impacts for cyber threat 
intelligence.
B. Probability Distribution Function on CSC Attack 
Propagation  
Probability distribution function (PDF) looks at the 
different probability outcomes or possible values for the 
random variables. We use probability distribution method 
to determine the outcome of an attack propagation on the 
CSC system to determine a product was modified during 
production, manipulated during distribution or manipulated 
during delivery after a cyber attack has been initiated.  
( ) = 1                        (1)
Cyber threat intelligence gathering and risk 
identification provide the organization knowledge of the 
vulnerabilities and threats to the organizational goal and 
basis to understanding the organization security situational 
awareness, a rationale to invest in security and the cost of 
alternatives.   
IV. CYBER SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MITIGATION 
PROCESS (CSCRM) 
This section considers, CSCRM approach as discusses 
in section 3, and implement the process of identifying 
organizational goal, assets, and requirements. 
IEC/ISO31000 proposes an architecture that incorporates 
the relations between risk management principles, 
framework and the processes by establishing concepts that 
explicitly address uncertainties, linking that to the 
organization framework mandate and establishing the 
processes [1]. Further, we Identification of vulnerable 
spots, attacks and probable risks. Furthermore, we identify 
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Figure 1. Cyber Supply Chain Risk Mitigation Process 
A.     Risk Awareness and Preparation
Risk awareness and preparation is the initial stage 
where the team organization accepts the fact that there are 
potential CSC risks to be considered from a strategic,
tactical and operational perspective.  
Activity 1: Establish the CSC Risk Context: A security 
strategic team is formed to oversee the CSC risk 
management process including representatives from all 
stakeholders to leverage communication, knowledge and 
cross functional information sharing. The rationale is to 
establish the context within which the risk charter, plan and 
motivation are structured and responsibilities are assigned. 
The role of the team is to identify all assets, various 
organizational and third party vendor goals, known attacks, 
known-unknown, and unknown-unknown to provide 
awareness and understanding of the CSC domain and the 
threat landscape. This allows the organization to 
proactively develop a strategy, determine the approach 
required and allocation of adequate resources for the 
process. The goal is to recognize and manage internal 
events and external threats that may affect the likelihood of 
a business continuity process and impact on the 
organizational goal by asking the following: 
What can go wrong (risk event): known-unknown
How to minimize the risk event’s impact: 
unknown-known
What can be done before an event occurs: 
unknown-known
What to do when an event occurs: Mitigation 
B. Risk Identification
The risk identification process includes identifying and 
listing all organizational assets and all possible attacks on 
the supply chain system that could be deemed as a risk. An 
important aspect of risk identification is the cyber threat 
intelligence, human threat intelligence and physical threat 
intelligence gatherings of threat actors, attack vectors, 
vulnerable spots and adversary goal require to mitigate the 
cyber risks. We follow the activities below:
C.     CSC Systems Assets and Infrastructure   
The Smart grid systems assets and the infrastructures 
consist of network architecture, wireless communication 
network, mesh topology and communication protocols that 
that supports the distributed control systems and SCADA 
systems. It has a power generation, transmission and 
distribution platforms that are connected to the main 
command and control systems. The smart grid uses 
Intelligence Electronic Devices (IED), Bus, router, 
switches and public facing IP address systems to connect to 
the supply inbound and outbound chains. The smart grid 
systems have firewalls connect to the CSC vendor system 
and substation access spots. For further reading in Smart 
grid. Refer [10]. We identify areas the threat actors could 



































Figure 2. CSC Smart Grid Systems Assets and Infrastructure 
Activities 1: Identify Organizational Goal: Involves 
bringing together the team and stakeholders to brainstorm 
and use other problem identification techniques to provide 
detailed identification of the organizational goal, each 
critical assets, supply inbound and outbound chains 
infrastructures, CSC requirements, processes, for 
examining and documenting the associated risk and 
vulnerabilities.  
Activity 2: Risk Breakdown Structure (RBS). Risk 
Breakdown Structure (RBS) is a technique used by the team 
to capture and profile all the assets, infrastructures, goals, 
internal and external threats and vulnerabilities. The 
rationale is to capture all the possible risks that could 
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Figure 3. Risk Breakdown Structure 
Activities 3: Examined CSC Security Domain: The CSC 
security domain is examined and investigated after the 
macro risks are captured, to identify possible attacks such 
as malware, spyware, and ransomware attack that could be 
initiated on the supply chain and the source of attacks. 
1. Identify specific risks by using: brainstorming, 
threat intelligence, reviewing of RBS listed, 
checklist of situational awareness, subjective and 
expert opinions of the various attack. 
2. Identify risks by auditing the third party 
organizations, classify them based on their service 
provisions and levels of integration of the various 
supply chain network system.
The process of identifying, investigating, research and 
reviewing the CSC network security systems, the existing 
infrastructures and that of the stakeholder systems provide 
cyber threat intelligence and situational awareness of 
potential risks. 
D.      Risk Assessment
The purpose of risk assessment is to provide 
evidence-based cyber threat intelligence and analysis to 
make informed decisions on how to treat a particular risk,
how to select between options and the cost of alternatives.
Risk assessment considers the likelihood of a risk after 
identifying and reviewing all probable threats and 
vulnerabilities that could cause a negative impact. The 
probability and impact of the risks are examined and 
quantified in two dimensions using probability and impact 
factors. The probability of the risk of becoming a reality has 
to be assessed using techniques such as an expert subjective 
judgment or discrete probability variables to determine the 
likelihood and impact. Risk assessment combines two 
techniques risk analysis and evaluation to determine the 











Figure 4. Risk Assessment Process 
Activity 1: Risk analysis involves using threat intelligence 
to identify possible sources of risk such as attack pattern, 
attack vectors, TTPs, adversary motives and intent. It also 
uses threat intelligence to identify threats or events that 
could have a harmful impact on an organizational goal such 
as product manipulation during production or manipulation 
during delivery or inserting spyware in a software that is 
bought off the shelf. 
Activity 2: Risk Scenario/Event: A scenario is used that 
combines three ideas to explain the concept of risk: we 
select an event (cyberattack), and then combines its 
probability of occurrence with its potential impact and 
cascading effects. Further, it estimates the risk by asking 
the following:  
What is the probability that this event will actually 
occur in the future? For instance a Ransomware or 
Remote Access Trojan attack. 
What would be the impact if it actually occurred? 
For instance, we use low, medium, high and 
extremely high probability to determine the 
likelihood. 
Due to the integrated nature of CSC, a high-risk 
event would have both a high probability of occurring and 
a big negative impact should it occur. The concept of cyber 
risk is always future-oriented and considers the impact the 
attack could have in the future and what to do when an event 
of a cyber attack.
E.     Probability Distribution Methods 
For the study, we adopted the probability distribution 
methods to mitigate CSC risks. The rationale for choosing 
probability distribution methods is that, CSC risks can be 
quantified based on how threats propagate on the supply 
inbound and outbound chains and its cascading impacts for 
cyber threat intelligence. Refer to our previous work in [10] 
for the attack analysis. 
F. Risk Scenario 
An organizational supply chain system incorporates 
other supplier, distributors and third-party vendors on the 
inbound and outbound chains. The security risk team has 
identified a malware attack on the CSC system. The team 
has decided to identify, assess and evaluate the severity of 
impact and probability of the cascading effects of the risk 
event.  We carry out a risk assessment on all the risk access 
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spots using a scenario. We assume that not all risk is
considered the same as some may be high risk than others. 
Risk is assessed according to its probability of the event and 
the impact factor. We categorize the severity and impact as 
by using a numerical scale of 1 (Low) to 5 (Very High) to 
determine the relative risks on the vulnerable spots where 
1-10 = Very Low, 11-20 = Low, 21-40 = Moderate. 41-70 
= High and 71-100 = Very High. 
Table 1. Probability and Risk Indicators









Firewall Organizational Goal No 70 High Wrong Firewall
IDS/IPS Requirements No 60 High Configuration
Vendor Service Provision No 80 High Audit
Network Model Topology No 60 Medium Sub-netting
IP Identify Users No 55 Medium Segmentation
Database Data Center Storage No 75 High Sanitizations
Software Off The Shelf No 75 High Reprogram/Update
Website Third Party Host No 90 High SSL/TLS
able 2. verity Matrix
Vulnerability Likelihood Impact Detection 
Difficulty
Cause of Risk
Firewall 5 70> 5 Failure to Invest in an incorrect firewall
IDS/IPS 4 60> 4 Lack of expertise
Vendor 5 80> 5 Lack of third party auditing
Network 4 60> 4 Poor  Network segmentation
IP 4 55> 4 Not Reviewing IP Addressing System
Database 4 75> 4 Using Data centers without auditing
Software 5 75> 5 Poor test: software bought off the shelf
Website 5 90> 5 Using hosted websites with others
The risk severity matrix in the table 2 provides us 
with a basis to prioritize which risk to address. Risks with 
impact level from 70> are considered as a high priority 
and receive immediate attention. Those risks with 40> are 
considered high risk and must be addressed if possible in 
line with the very high risks as their impact could affect 
the supply chain integration. For instance using a public 
facing IP address system on a hosted website makes the 
CSC system very highly vulnerable to an attacker could 
use island hopping attacks to penetrate the website, gain 
access to the network and manipulate the software to 
cause product alteration or manipulate delivery channel.  
G. Risk Evaluation 
We classify the probable risks using probability 
distribution techniques below as discussed in section 3 to 
evaluate the risks as in the following order.
Table 3. Risk Classification
Cause of Risk Risk Classification Risk Assessment
Failure to Invest correct firewall High Impact, High 
Probability
Neutralize the risk by purchasing the correct firewall based on 
organizational goal and requirement
Lack of expertise High Impact, Low 
Probability
Neutralize risk by competent and qualified the competent security staff.
Lack of Third Party Auditing High Probability, Low 
Impact
The risk can be mitigated with regular internal and external auditing.
Poor  Network Segmentation Low Probability, High 
Impact
The network can be segmented and Firewall/IPS placed between them
so that any remote attack on each network may not impact the other.
Not Reviewing IP Address System Low Probability, Low 
Impact
The risk can be neutralized by using IP Analyzers and other penetration 
testing tools to identify vulnerable spots
Using Data centres without auditing Low Probability, High 
Impact
Mitigate risk by auditing data centres and sanitize the database as an 
an attack may expose customer data, cause Data theft,  ID theft risk to all 
those connected to the CSC
Poor test: software bought 
off the shelf
High Impact, Low 
Probability
Neutralize the risk by testing the software and third party software before 
customization and installation to the supply chain
Using hosted websites with other High Impact, High 
Probability
The organization uses the public facing IP address system for the supply 
inbound and outbound chains is dangerous and must be mitigated.
V.  PROBABILITY OF CYBER SUPPLY CHAIN 
ATTACK PROPAGATION 
This section determines the probability of attack 
propagation as discussed in section 3. We use a discrete 
random variable method as a random variable that can take 
on any value from a discrete set of values as specified. For 
the study, we use six different types of attacks variables to set 
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possible finite values of CSC risks, where the values in the 
set are numbered from 123456. We use the internal or 
external threat as our inference since the likelihood of risk of 
an attack could take on any of these two forms. The 
probability distribution method determines the outcome of a 
risk of an attack propagation on the CSC system initiated 
from anywhere. The six types of attacks include internal 
attack, external cyber attack, modified during production, 
manipulated during distribution, manipulated during 
delivery, or manipulated during installation after a cyber 
attack has been initiated. The rationale is that we can 
enumerate all the risk values from 1–6 in the set of its possible 
value and sum over up all these possibilities and the 
likelihood of occurrence.  
We assign the risks (X) as the discrete random variable 
(Threats) and assume its probability distribution function 
P(x) by assigning a probability that X is equal to each of its 
possible values as specified.  For instance, if we identify six 
different risks on a supply chain system, we can assign a 
probability of 1/6 to each of the six risks. In the cyber threat 
landscape where we use discrete random variables, the 
probability of threat distribution could be referred to as a 
probability mass function P(x). We define the value of P(x) 
with a subscript as the probability that a random variable X 
(Risks) equals the given number x (Threats), i.e. Px(x) = 
Pr(X=x). In a cyber attack environment, a valid probability 
function P(x) must be non-negative for each possible risk 
value x. Further, the random threat variable is given a number 
of values in the set of possible values with a probability of at 
least one attack, so we require that P(x) must sum to one 
especially as part of the CSC systems requirements capturing: 
P(x) ≥ 0 for all x            (2) 
Where the summation is implicitly applied to all 
possible values of X (Risks). For instance, in an event of a 
cyberattack, the probability of any of the six risks occurring 
is calculated as: 
( ) =  0    {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}ℎ                (3)                                                        
Due to the uncertainties in the event of an attack, we 
could assume that the relative likelihood of an attack can be 
initiated externally or internally. Therefore, let X (Risk) be 
the sum of any of the six attack variable outcomes listed in 
section 5. Then X could take on any value in the set {1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} in a random variable. Thus, P(x) is 
calculated as: 








                 (4)
A.    Constructing a Probability Distribution
We construct a discrete probability distribution for 
random variable X by defining as the number of attacks and 
risk of manipulations that could be deployed on the CSC after 
an internal or external cyber attack. We ask the following 
question and uses the determinants as below to determine the 
motives and intent of the adversary: What is the probability 
of a risk on the CSC after initiating an attack? Assuming: 
X = Risk = A risk could be internal or external 
P = Probability  
C = External Cyberattack  
A = Internal Attack 
P = Modified During Production 
S = Manipulated During Supply 
D = Manipulated During Delivery  
I = Manipulated During Installation 
Probability Distribution looks at the different 
probability outcomes or possible values for the random 
variables. We plot the outcomes to determine how the 
distribution is spread out among those possible outcomes.  





Probability Distribution for the Random Variables 
P(X=0) = 1/8 = CPD  
P(X=1) = 3/8 = CSD, CAI, CDI  
P(X=2) = 3/8 = ASD, PSD, PDI  
P(X=1) = 1/8 = APD 
VI. RESULTS 
This section discusses the results of probabilities of the 
cyberattack propagation and its impact on the CSC system. 
A. Probability Distribution Analysis 
From the probability distribution table 1, our analysis reveals 
eight different probabilities of risk on the CSC system could 
be compromised with various manipulation schemes.  
CPD: The adversary could initiate cyberattack, then cause 
manipulation during production and then manipulation 
during delivery. The motive and intent of the adversary are to 
penetrate the CSC system, manipulate the product by 
inserting malware in the code at the software development 
stage that will trigger at the during the delivery channels and 
divert the products to wrong sources. These could cause 
Intellectual property theft, Industrial espionage, command & 
control and DoS attacks and impact the organizational goal 
and assets.   
CSD, CAI, CDI: Indicates that adversaries could cause an 
internal or cyber attack on the supply chain, cause manipulate 
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during supply and installation. The adversary’s motives and 
intent of the attack are more geared towards industrial 
espionage and advance persistent threat using remote access 
Trojan or rootkit attack where the adversary targets user with 
UBS drives, insert a virus on it, to initiate the attack. 
ASD, PSD, PDI: Indicates that the adversary could cause 
an internal attack, then manipulate the product during supply 
and manipulation during installation. The motive and intent 
of the adversary are to insert spyware into the product in order 
that when a user installs the product and runs it, the virus 
propagates to other on the network and also provides the 
adversary access to the network for further manipulations.    
APD: The adversary could attack internally, then cause 
manipulate during production and manipulation during 
delivery. The motive and intent of the adversary are to gain 
access to customer personal details, credit card details, and 
any information relevant to be able to exploit the customers.   
  
VII.  RISK MITIGATION 
We follow the following risk mitigation process to 
determine how to respond to the various cyberattacks. 
   
A.     Risk Response 
  Risk response decides on how to treat the risks and who 
is responsible for each risk in order to ensure proper 
mitigation procedures. We consider a number of methods to 
handle risk. These are factors we consider when mitigating 
the risk: Transfer the risk, Accept the risk, Avoid the risk, 
Reduce the risk, Share the risk, or Accept the risk. 
B. Risk Mitigation
Acts on threat intelligence gathered and implements control 
mechanisms, policies, and audit trails to lessen the impact or 
chance of the risk occurring. This includes making a strategic 
decision, resources availability, and draw up an agreement 
with all stakeholders and get it sign-off by all party as well as 
establishing a cyber risk information-sharing platform.
Transfer the risk: Paying a premium insurance companies 
to pass the risk to another party Insurance is a means of 
transferring the financial impact of having a risk occur. 
Subcontracting can also be done using data centres and 
Internet service providers. This gives the organization a
chance to make a vendor responsible for a particular risk.
Avoid the risk: Includes implementing CTI, security 
measures, budget allocation, configurations, certifying 
systems, carrying out penetration testing, regular updates, 
regular backups, audit stakeholder organization and third 
party vendors, contingency planning and controls to 
eliminate the CSC risk.
Sharing the risk - Allocating supply chain system 
resources to different organization and segmenting the 
system to different parties in order to share risk. This process 
ensures that risks threat information is share 
Reduce the risk: By creating awareness, training and 
educating users, employ experts, establish, formal 
communication mechanisms, Implement monitoring and 
controls strategies, and auditing third party vendors regularly. 
Accept the risk: These are unknown-known and 
unknown-unknown risks that are inevitable to avoid such as
zero-day attacks, earthquake, power failure, system failure. 
Contingency planning is used to mitigate such risks. They are 
uncertain risks in that the effort to do anything is not 
worthwhile or nothing can be done at present. In such a
situation, the CSC system is reviewed from time to time 
during the course of inbound and outbound activities. 
C.     Risk Monitoring & Control 
As discussed in section 4. the process of monitoring and 
controlling all the risks identified and categorized in the risk 
register. It includes establishing and executing the risk 
response strategy, monitoring events that are considered as 
high probability, contingency planning and monitoring new 
risks. Due to the uncertainties and fuzziness surrounding the 
cyberattacks on the supply inbound and outbound chains, 
CSC risks identified, assessed and managed have to be 
monitored regularly. This is to ensure that any change in the 
risk status and the risk register are updated on a regular basis 
for information assurance and situational awareness 
purposes. The process involves:
The risk management team must systematically 
track and evaluate the performance of risk 
management strategies in line with the risk register 
and audit trails. 
Organize ad-hoc and regular risk reviews meeting to 
identify changes in the cyber threat landscape, 
outstanding software updates, risk probability and 
impact trends, update risk register, remove outdated 
risks, and identify new risks. For, instance OWASP 
Top 10 threats provides current risks and threat 
updates.  
The risk monitoring and control process includes: 
Prioritize high probability risks and monitor CSC 
audit trail of threat and vulnerabilities for 
contingency planning purposes.  
Run regular reports from Firewalls and IDS/IPD and 
monitor network penetration activities and anomalies. 
Run reports on from the IP Analyzer tool and monitor for 
any intrusion activities and anomalies.  
Implement regular and ad-hoc supply inbound and 
outbound chain audit on third party vendors 
Sanitize the database system and monitor user 
transactions. 
Implement stakeholder configuration management 
system that incorporates all supplier and distributors.   
D.  Risk Communication 
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Risk Communication includes organizing training and 
works, implementing policies and processes and procedures 
that orient the staff towards an understanding of the risks,
threats and vulnerabilities that may exist. The rationale is to 
create awareness, understanding, and expose users to the 
potential dangers and the impact it may have on the product,
business process, reputation, and jobs in the event of an 
attack. 
E. Comparing Results with Other Works 
 There are existing related works on cyber supply chain risk 
management and cyber physical system. Comparatively we 
reviewed risk management methods used to mitigate threats in 
Section 2 [6, 13, 18]. Ref [6], proposed a mitigating risk of a 
cyberattack on a smart grid system by discussing the 
fragmented landscape of studies into the risk of cyber attacks 
on a smart meter, system engineering and fault tolerance. Ref 
[13], proposed an intuitive scheme for the categorization of 
cybersecurity risk assessment methods for SCADA systems by 
analyzing the twenty-four risk assessment method. Ref [18], 
proposed an intuitive scheme for categorizing cybersecurity 
risk assessment method for SCADA systems after reviewing 
24 risk assessment methods applied in the context of SCADA 
systems. However, our work looked at mitigating cyber supply 
chain risks from inbound and outbound chains on the smart 
grid. Our work looked at identifying the CSC risk using risk 
breakdown structures. Then analysis the risk using probability 
distribution methods to determine risk propagation and 
cascading effects.    
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Cyber supply chain risk mitigation has become a 
major risk factor due to the integrated nature of the supplier 
inbound and outbound chains. Further, the uncertainties and 
fuzziness that surrounds and supply chain risks have become 
enormous as adversaries are using attacks such as island 
hopping on third party vendors to attack the main 
organization. A remote access Trojan attack on a vendor may 
expose the supplier chain system of the different 
organization, and the third party vendors.   In this paper we 
have used risk mitigation concepts and risk management 
methods in supply CSC organizational landscape to identify, 
assess, analyze, evaluate and respond to CSC risks. To 
demonstrate the applicability of the method, we have used a 
risk assessment method and a malware attack scenario to 
determine the probability of an attack, the likelihood and 
impact factors as our risk indicators. Further, we have used 
probability distribution method to determine the probable 
risks and the probability of cascading to other networks. For 
instance, we have been able to determine that the adversary 
could initiate a cyber attack remotely, then cause 
manipulation during production and then manipulate the 
delivery channels. Furthermore, we have determined that the 
motive and intent of the adversary is to penetrate the CSC 
system, manipulate the product by inserting malware in the 
code at the software development stage. Finally, we have 
used a smart grid system as our case study to identify assets, 
infrastructures and the vulnerable spots that could be 
exploited. Further study will include cyberattack prediction 
using machine learning techniques. Secondly, we are 
working a paper in software reliability in Cyber Physical 
Systems. 
REFERENCES 
1. E. Vanpoucke, A. Vereecke, and S. Muylle. “Leveraging the impact of 
supply chain integration through information technology”, International 
Journal of Operations & Production Management, Emerald Insight. Vol. 37, 
2017. No. 4, pp.510-530. doi.org/10.1108/IJOPM-07-2015-0441. 
2. E. K. Thorpe, “50% of Cyber Attacks Now Use Inland Hopping” July 
2019.
3. NIST1500-203. Framework for Cyber-Physical Systems. 2017. 
https://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=924021
4. B. Woods, and A. Bochman, “Supply Chain in the Software Era”
Atlantic Council: Washington, DC, USA, 2018.
5. National Cyber Security Centre.” Example of Supply Chain Attacks.” 
GCHQ. 2018. 
6. E. B. Rice and AlMajali. “Mitigating the Risk of Cyber Attack on Smart 
Grid Systems” Conference on Systems Engineering Research. Elsevier. 28. 
2014. 575-582. doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2014.03.070. 
7. A. Yeboah-Ofori, J. D. Abduli, F.   Katsriku. “Cybercrime and Risks for 
Cyber Physical Systems” International Journal of Cyber Security and Digital 
Forensics. 2019. 
8. D.A Brown, Best Practices in Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management; 
Intel; 2017. https://www.nist.gov/document-18221. 
9. NCSC “Supply Chain Security Guidance: Twelve Principles” National 
Cyber Security Center. Version 1. 2018 
10. A. Yeboah-Ofori, and S. Islam. Cyber Security Threat Modeling for 
Supply Chain Organizational Environments. Future Internet, 2019. 11, 63, 
doi: 10.3390/611030063. 
11. ISO31000:2009. Risk Management Principles and Guidelines: 
International Organization for Standardization: Geneva, Switzerland. 
12. ISO/IEC 27005: Information Technology Security Risk Management. 
International Organization for Standardization: Geneva, Switzerland, 
(2018). 
13. Y. Cherdantseva, P. Burnap, A. Blyth, P. Eden, K. Jones, H. Soulsby, 
and K Stoddart. “A Review of Cyber Security Risk Assessment Methods for 
SCADA Systems. Elsevier, Computer & Security, 56, 2016, Pg 1-27. 
doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2015.09.009. 
14. S. Yoneda, S. Tanimoto, T. Konosu. “Risk Assessment in Cyber-
Physical Systems in Office Environment” 18th International Conference on 
Network-Based Information Systems. IEEE. 2015. DOI 
10.1109/NBiS.2015.63. 
15. NIST 800-30. “Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments” National 
Institute of Standards and Technology. Version1. 2012. 
16. B. R. Rowe and M. P. Gallaher. “Private Sector Cyber Security 
Investment Strategies: An Empirical Analysis” March 2006
17. K. M. Carter, N. Idika, and W. Streilein. “Probabilistic Threat 
Propagation for Network Security” IEEE Transaction on Information 
Forensics and Security, Vol. 9, No. 9. 2014. Pg. 1394-1405. 
Doi:10.1109/TIFS.2014.2334272. 
18. S. C. Patel, J. H. Graham, P. A. S. Ralston. Quantitatively Assessing the 
vulnerability of Critical Information Systems: A New Method for Evaluating 
Security Enhancement. International Journal of Information Management. 
Elsevier. 28, 2008, 438-491. doi:10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2008.01.009. 
81
